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Padded, adjustable shoulder strap. Stores By Category. The bag swings to the front and the main compartments open up as a work tray together with the tackle boxes that pocket hole jig 3d king inside. By Christmas Day, the th had cleared the mountains and was ordered back to its base camp at Bito Beach. In addition to not having to worry about the toys breaking, the material is also easy to clean if needed. Operates on 2 AA batteries. Gerhart, the th AIR executive officer, was promoted to regimental command.

The Japanese were holed up all around the airstrip. Initially, the strongest resistance was met in front of the engineers to the west. By maneuvering his companies, Davis succeeded in pushing across to the north of the airstrip.

That evening, the composite force set up in a tight defensive perimeter in that area where it remained for the next few days in defense of the San Pablo airstrip. Meanwhile, 60 Japanese paratroopers had jumped onto the Buri airstrip.

By the middle of the morning of 7 December, the Japanese had completely occupied the undefended airstrip. On the night of December, the USAAF service personnel had abruptly fled the airstrip, leaving behind their weapons; the Japanese made "best use" of them. Pearson directed elements of his battalion to hold this force in place while he organized his attack on the Buri airstrip to the east. At , both battalions advanced toward the Buri airstrip.

Pearson decided to withdraw both battalions to the north and consider another way to attack the airstrip. He made a personal reconnaissance around the west end of the airstrip and decided to move a couple of rifle platoons to the west and then south to the south side of the airstrip.

In this position, machine guns and mortars could bring in supporting fire. Pearson directed the battalion's lead elements to turn southward while the machine guns were set up close to the edge of the landing strip. In less than a minute, their crews had the machine guns firing at a group of Japanese hurrying across the airstrip. In about 15 minutes, the machine-gun crews ran out of ammunition.

Two men crawled to the rear to get more ammunition and returned with orders to withdraw. The three rifle companies ran into heavy Japanese fire but continued their advance. By , the "dog-tired" Americans were holding the southwest corner of the airstrip with their ammunition running low. The two infantry battalions had been alerted at on 7 December for movement to San Pablo.

Moving out at , the infantrymen covered the first yards m without incident but were stopped by a rain-swollen swamp. Attempts to bypass the swamp were fruitless and they were forced to wade through the sometimes shoulder-high water. The th Infantry companies lost contact with each other during the crossing.

Because of the lateness of the hour and the fact that observation had shown there were "many more Japanese" on the north of the airstrip than had been estimated, it was decided to establish defensive perimeters for the night. At , the sector was reported quiet. With the arrival of the th and nd Infantry battalions in his area, Lieutenant Colonel Pearson felt that he could now attack and secure the length of the Buri airstrip.

But that was not yet to be. It was an inviting target for the Japanese 26th Division descending out of the hills to the west of Burauen. From the heights, they could see the battle for control of the Buri airstrip. They were also in a position to block the Japanese from attacking eastward toward Burauen. The Buri airstrip was finally clear. At , a battalion-sized force from the Japanese 26th Division launched an attack out of the hills to the west of Burauen against the various US installations in and around Burauen.

The Japanese were four days late in arriving at their line of departure for the planned combined assault on the Burauen airfields, primarily because they were trying to move eastward along the same mountain trails that the th PIR was using to move westward.

Only a little more than a battalion of the Japanese division, which was to have assisted the Japanese 16th Division, managed to arrive in a very disorganized condition. The Japanese began firing at the Fifth Air Force administration buildings. The Fifth Air Force personnel were pushed back until they reached the hospital. First Lieutenant John G.

The hospital's commanding officer, concerned about the safety of his staff and patients, had earlier asked Hurster to set up a perimeter around the hospital. Hurster had complied, using cooks, supply troops, and drivers to man the perimeter. During the Japanese attack, Hurster and his assortment of converted infantrymen held their position.

On the morning of 11 December, they found 19 dead Japanese. This small battle marked the end of the attack by the remnants of the Japanese 26th Division and was the last major effort by the Japanese to regain control of the Burauen airfields.

The th had landed on Leyte not expecting to be committed to combat. Under those circumstances, coupled with the surprise Japanese assault on thinly defended installations, the th, committed to combat unexpectedly and in haste, performed superbly.

Further tests of their fighting skill were in the immediate offing. The mission of the 11th Airborne Division was now to fight its way over the mountains to the west coast and link up with the US Sixth Army, which was fighting its way up the west coast, north of Albuera. Once there, Ori discovered that the OP commanded a view of a strong Japanese position on a plateau beneath it. That night, the Japanese hit Ori's position. Ori called in mortar fire from Anonang that drove off the Japanese. The next day, Ori sent a platoon down from the OP to probe the Japanese position.

The Japanese opened up with machine guns, wounding the platoon leader and two of his men. Ori ordered a withdrawal. The 11th Airborne Division's G-2 intelligence had determined the locations of the main Japanese forces remaining within the division's AO. The artillery's forward observers with the rifle companies could hardly find their spotting rounds through the thick jungle overhang that limited visibility to a few yards.

They had reverted to adjustment by sound — which proved not entirely accurate. The attack was called off.

Mahonag was nothing more than a field on a hillside, about yards m long by yards m wide, studded with stumps and fallen trees, and packed with hundreds of slit trenches deep enough for a soldier to stand in. The DZ was littered with boxes, cans, and debris from spent airdropped ration packs. The air was filled with the odor of unburied, decomposing Japanese bodies and a large, prosperous swarm of flies.

In the middle of December, General Swing relocated his infantry battalions. The th GIR moved to a location near Manarawat. Colonel Hildebrand and several members of the th GIR headquarters staff moved to Anonang by way of Manarawat to take over command of operations in the central mountains from Anonang to Mahonag. On 21 December, General Swing flew into Manarawat and hiked up to Mahonag, arriving late in the afternoon.

Swing wanted to personally direct the breakthrough and the th was pushing forward along the Japanese MSR that ran along a ridge in the direction of Ormoc.

At about , the column reached the approach to Rock Hill. At the same time, the th on Rock Hill launched its attack on a Japanese-occupied ridge to clear the last known Japanese position blocking the advance. The th attack cracked the Japanese defenses with demolition charges , flamethrowers , bazookas , and hand grenades. By , the ridge was firmly in the th's possession. After putting a Japanese machine gun position out of action and clearing out several weak Japanese pockets of resistance, Giordano and his platoon reached a point high on the western slope of a mountain from where they could see Leyte's west coast.

The battalion halted and popped a purple smoke grenade , the signal for friendly forces intended to attract elements of the US 77th Infantry Division that might be in the vicinity.

On a ridgeline to the west, purple smoke was observed. However, the appearance of the rugged terrain between the two US forces promised that more fighting would take place before physical contact was made. The column pushed on, continuing to follow the Japanese MSR, and soon reached the approaches to a "dangerous-looking position to the front. As the column closed up, all the command hierarchy came forward to learn the reason for the halt.

The patrol soon returned and reported that the ridgeline to the front was honeycombed with caves and deeply dug-in foxholes, that it appeared to have been heavily shelled and recently abandoned, and that the area was littered with dead Japanese. Giordano led his platoon to the top of the ridge and found the position well laid out, camouflaged , and dug into almost solid rock. The number of Japanese dead served as mute evidence of heavy fighting.

Among the dead were two American soldiers who appeared to have been killed less than 24 hours before. When he reached the west end of the ridge, Giordano could see Ormoc and the seacoast.

To his front, about yards m away, he saw more dug-in emplacements that were soon alive with members of the US 32nd Infantry Regiment. They were amazed to see fellow Americans coming through the same Japanese positions that had given them so much trouble earlier. We saw the purple smoke, but we didn't think that you were coming over that hill.

Last night, it was solid with Japanese. We lost two of our boys on it. By Christmas Day, the th had cleared the mountains and was ordered back to its base camp at Bito Beach. The Japanese pocket at Anonang had still not been wiped out. Early on in his mountain clearing campaign, Swing realized that the Japanese position at Anonang was substantial and that it would take a well-coordinated multi-battalion effort to knock it out.

He decided not to attack it in strength while the major portion of his infantry assets was fighting across the mountains to the west, which was his major mission ordered by General Krueger at Sixth Army headquarters.

Now that he had linked up with the 77th Infantry Division, he felt that he could deal with the final Japanese redoubt in his AO. The Japanese defenses at Anonang were on two parallel ridges. On the first ridge, the Japanese had dug spider holes , each between 8 and 10 feet 2.

They had also dug in machine guns with overhead cover and interlocking fields of fire on both ridges. All slope faces were studded with caves that overlooked and controlled the narrow trails.

In the rear of the defensive position was a bivouac area, cached with ammunition, rations, and other supplies, large enough to accommodate a regiment. The position was a concentration point for the Japanese troops in the area and it was estimated that at least 1, Japanese were dug in along the ridges and gorges.

The second ridge, where the Japanese had concentrated the bulk of their defenses and their manpower, would become known among the 11th Airborne troops as Purple Heart Hill.

Consequently, the Recon Platoon dug in on the northwest corner of the Japanese defensive network. Colonel Robert H. Soule, the th's commanding officer, was in overall command of the assault on Purple Heart Hill. As soon as they were within range and sight, the Japanese took them under heavy fire from deep entrenchments.

The Japanese on Purple Heart Hill were so well entrenched and so numerous that Colonel Soule decided to blast them with as much artillery fire as he could muster before ordering any ground attacks. The entire battalion closed in at dusk but had no time to dig in; they just moved into the old foxholes and revetments from which they had blasted the Japanese.

Those Japanese that had not been killed in the assault scattered to the north and west. The battle for Purple Heart Hill was over after almost five weeks of containment followed by the final attack. A search of the area found dead Japanese. How many were buried in the subterranean galleries was unknown. Most of the division withdrew to the Bito Beach base camp. The th and th GFABs, still bereft of their artillery pieces and acting as infantry, remained in the hills outside Burauen, scouting and patrolling the eastern approaches to the Leyte hills.

By 15 January , all division units had returned to Bito Beach. He also assigned Swing a top priority: get to Manila , the major prize of the Pacific War to date, ahead of his competition, General Krueger's Sixth Army. The Battle of Leyte was over. Ahead was more intense fighting for the Allies. In the tents on Bito Beach, in the mess lines, and wherever the GIs gathered, the main topic of conversation centered on the location of their next fight. They had heard rumors that the 11th Airborne Division's paratroopers had been alerted for a jump ahead of the Sixth Army at Nichols Field outside Manila.

But toward the end of the month, unit commanders received a supply of handbooks describing the terrain and geography of southern Luzon. Division staff studied the area from Nasugbu east to Batangas City and north to Manila. Rumor became reality when the division received orders for an operation in southern Luzon. The Japanese defenders numbered about , men. To defend the largest island in the Philippines, most of the Japanese troops withdrew from the coastal regions and prepared for a long delaying action in the island's interior.

Their objective was to hold Luzon as long as possible to prevent the Allies from using it as a base of operations against the Japanese homeland. The main Japanese force of about , men was deployed in several mountain strongholds in the north; another 50, men defended southern Luzon and the hills east of Manila; the third force of 30, men was stationed west of the Luzon Plain in the hills dominating the huge Clark Field complex.

An amphibious RCT would prepare to land in the Nasugbu area on Luzon's southwest corner, seize, and defend the beachhead ; an airborne RCT would prepare to move by air from Mindoro bases, land by parachute on Tagaytay Ridge, about 20 miles 32 km to the east of the Nasugbu landing zone, and effect a juncture with the RCT moving inland from Nasugbu.

The 11th Airborne Division, reinforced after assembling on Tagaytay Ridge, would prepare for further action to the north and east as directed by the Eighth Army. The US Seventh Fleet would shell the beaches for one hour before the landing and the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Air Forces would provide assault and close air support. The Eighth Army designated D-day as 31 January. The order also scheduled an amphibious dry run for the th and th glider infantry units that were more prepared to enter combat by landing in a field than they were in wading ashore from a Navy landing craft.

On 26 January, as directed, the first three waves loaded, pushed out into Leyte Bay, and then came churning back to "assault" Bito Beach. Swing deemed the dry run a success and ordered the division's amphibious elements to embark aboard their ships for the cruise to Nasugbu. The th GIR, glider and parachute trained, was now going to emulate the Marines — storm across the beaches from the sea.

The catch to the loading out of the division's amphibious elements was what ships the Navy would send, and this was not definite until the ships arrived at approximately on 25 January.

Most of the supply ships were completely loaded within 24 hours, except for the great bulk of engineer supplies, ammunition, and gasoline. The landing craft for the troops arrived at on 27 January, and soon thereafter, the troops went aboard. The assault convoy of over ships and landing craft of all types weighed anchor and steamed out to sea from Leyte that afternoon.

An additional eight landing craft carried the th RCT to Mindoro. Many 11th Airborne Division units went through staff and command changes. At dawn on 31 January , the convoy arrived off Nasugbu in clear skies and calm seas. On their landing craft, the men of the th and th RCTs could see the white landing beaches, the town of Nasugbu, and the green mountains of southern Luzon beyond.

At , the Navy began shelling and rocketing Red Beach, the designated landing area. An hour later, the shelling stopped and the beachmaster landing party headed for shore. At , the first wave of eight LCVP landing craft motored ashore, ran up on the beach, dropped their ramps, and the th RCT's glider riders turned amphibians waded ashore through surf sometimes up to their chests.

The first assault troops, a reconnaissance-in-force from Lieutenant Colonel Ernest H. Some Japanese, in caves on Nasugbu Point to the north and San Diego Point on the south flank of the beachhead, fired machine guns sporadically and dropped a few artillery rounds along the beach until LaFlamme sent off patrols to silence the opposition. By , the th had moved through Wawa, Nasugbu, and its airstrip. At , General Eichelberger ordered the landing of the remainder of the amphibious force. The remainder of the th RCT assumed responsibility for the Nasugbu beachhead.

By , all combat elements of the two glider RCTs were moving inland. General Eichelberger and his small Eighth Army command group had landed and joined General Swing near the head of the column marching up Highway 17 to link up with the th RCT. MacArthur's primary objective on Luzon was the capture of Manila and the airbase at Clark Field, which were required to support future operations.

General Eichelberger reasoned that if he could make the Japanese think that his small force moving up Highway 17 across Tagaytay Ridge and heading for Manila from the south was a larger force, he would have a tactical advantage and a relatively unopposed run-up to the capital. By , the lead unit had reached the Palico River Bridge that spanned a gorge 85 feet 26 m deep and feet 76 m wide. The th RCT had moved inland so rapidly that the Japanese sappers preparing to blow the bridge were caught by surprise.

The lead elements dashed across the bridge and routed the Japanese. The th AEB inactivated the demolition charges and reinforced the bridge sections that the Japanese had weakened. By , the bridge and surrounding area were secured. At , the th RCT was in the vicinity of Tumalim, about 8 miles 13 km inland from the beachhead. Beyond Tumalim, the highway rose more sharply and the advance slowed as the th RCT found itself moving cautiously through narrow passes, bordered by steep wooded banks, ideal for ambushes.

The normal tactic of fighting the Japanese in the Pacific was to halt just before dark and set a perimeter defense before eating whatever rations were on hand and bedding down for the night. General Eichelberger discerned that if the th RCT kept moving at night, the Japanese might be thrown off balance and would not be able to practice their customary night probes of the American defenses.

Eichelberger felt that he had the momentum and told General Swing to push on by the light of the full moon. At on 1 February, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson halted the march. Almost 20 hours after wading ashore at Nasugbu, the men slept for two hours and were up and off again up the road at At the foot of Mount Cariliao was Mount Aiming.

The three peaks gave the Japanese a perfect defensive position that dominated the highway. The hostile fire from the heights around the road that slowed the th RCT's advance appeared to be from a Japanese outpost. The MLR was a string of caves, dugouts, and tank traps , all interconnected by a zigzag line of trenches, backed up with various Japanese artillery pieces emplaced to the north and east of Mount Aiming. Artillery rounds from these guns bracketed the highway.

There were Japanese infantrymen in caves and trenches on Mount Aiming and across the highway. The Japanese defenses into which the th RCT had now run appeared to be the line to which the Japanese had been falling back; the Japanese were now ready to fight. The th and th GFABs' howitzers were brought forward to support the infantry attack. The attack got underway at when the th RCT's forward air control observer directed USAAF fighter and medium bomber close air support strafing and bombing of the Japanese positions.

The artillery echelon fired concentrations on Japanese defensive positions and counter-battery fire on the Japanese artillery positions. Seizing Mount Aiming pierced and split the Japanese defenses in the area. On the morning of 2 February, the th RCT launched an all-out attack to the east.

The pace up the highway was slow initially but quickened as the Japanese were forced to withdraw with the capture of a regimental CP at , which showed the haste in which the Japanese departed. In the defense of their CP, the Japanese had built three tank traps across the highway 20 feet 6.

Throughout the night, the Japanese harassed the forward American units with artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire. Eichelberger was under orders from General MacArthur not to bring in the th RCT until he was certain that the amphibious units could link up with the paratroopers in less than 24 hours. The three battalions advanced rapidly against little resistance until General Pierson arrived and Lieutenant Colonel LaFlamme told him that his point men could see Japanese on the high ground to the south.

Colonel Soule drove up and was discussing the situation with Pierson when all hell broke loose. The Japanese opened up with artillery, machine-gun, and small-arms fire. Pierson jumped into a roadside ditch and Soule jumped in on top of him. Soule received a shell fragment in his buttocks and commented to Pierson that he had been hit.

Not only were Pierson and Soule pinned down by the artillery fire, but so were many other high-ranking officers, including General Eichelberger and several colonels and lieutenant colonels. The artillery barrages forced everyone to take cover. Soule removed himself from the ditch and immediately assumed command of the attack on the Japanese position. Wilson ordered his lead company to swing around behind the Japanese position and take it from the rear. The position was obviously an important one in the Japanese defensive plan; it was honeycombed with enormous supply tunnels, reinforced-concrete caves, and strong artillery and individual firing positions.

With the reduction of Shorty Ridge, named after Colonel "Shorty" Soule, the amphibious units of the 11th Airborne Division that had landed and fought their way up a difficult route of attack were ready to make contact with the paratroopers of the th PIR. Because of a shortage of transport aircraft, only about one-third of the th RCT could be airdropped in one lift ; the jump was planned for three waves delivered over two days. Tagaytay Ridge made an excellent DZ for a mass parachute drop.

The area selected for the DZ was flat, over 4, yards 3, m long and about 2, yards 1, m wide. The only dangerous feature was the possibility of being blown off the ridge and down into Taal Lake.

But that did not happen to any of the paratroopers. What did happen was that the first 18 planeloads of paratroopers landed right on DZs marked by smoke pots set out by advance scouts. The second serial of thirty C—47s carrying paratroopers dropped 6 miles 9. Only paratroopers dropped onto the proper drop point; 1, landed between 4 and 6 miles 6. Despite the scattered landings, the th RCT reassembled in about five hours, and by , made contact with the lead elements of the th RCT moving up Tagaytay Ridge.

The 11th Airborne Division CP moved into the Manila Hotel Annex, which was in a central position on the ridge and made a convenient control point for the troops moving east and north. Generals Eichelberger and Swing had hoped that the th RCT could move to the north and on to Manila in the afternoon, but there was not enough motor transport or gasoline available to permit it.

By 4 February, ten C—47s landed at Nasugbu's dirt airstrip, widened and cleared by the th AEB, with a cargo of gasoline that was immediately sent forward. Swing cautioned Skau that he was driving into unknown territory and to radio back as soon as he encountered Japanese defenses.

At on 4 February, Skau reported back that the road was secure as far as Imus , where the Japanese had blown the Imus River bridge and set up a defensive position, but he had found a dirt road that bypassed the bridge. It, too, had a bridge ready to be blown but the recon patrol had removed the charges. The th RCT, by truck and on foot, moved forward and was now pushing against the southern Japanese defenses of Manila. To assist in the vast task of covering the large area that the 11th Airborne Division had liberated, General Eichelberger brought ashore the US 19th Infantry Regiment less one battalion.

The force was not large enough to take on large Japanese concentrations, but active patrols were able to drive the Japanese farther into the surrounding hills. In the future, the entire 11th Airborne Division would return to wipe out the Japanese pockets of resistance, but first, it had to assist in the subjugation of Manila. In a few days, both th RCT infantry battalions would move to the area south of Manila to join the th RCT in what would prove to be one of the 11th Airborne Division's bloodiest fights.

By on the night of 4 February , the th RCT had advanced as far as the Paranaque River bridge, the southern boundary of metropolitan Manila. It was here that the 11th Airborne Division ran into well-planned and heavily-manned Japanese defenses that could not be bypassed; they had found the right anchor of the Japanese Genko Line.

Naval guns salvaged from damaged or sunken ships were set in concrete emplacements, and horizontally-firing antiaircraft artillery was tactically located to assist in the defense.

Many of the concrete pillboxes were two and three stories deep. The Genko Line held some 6, Japanese in over 1, pillboxes supported by 44 heavy artillery pieces, antiaircraft artillery weapons that could fire vertically at aircraft or horizontally at ground troops. All roads leading to the Genko Line were heavily mined with pound bombs armed with low-pressure detonators.

Imperial Japanese Navy Land Forces were ground combat units consisting of navy personnel organized for offensive operations and the defense of Japanese naval facilities. On 4 February, the Japanese had a few troops at Nielson Field , 2 miles 3.

These defenses also formed part of the Genko Line. Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi commanded the Manila defenses. He had 20, men under his command, consisting of 16, naval troops and 4, army troops who had been trapped by the American pincers movement on Manila from the north and south.

Before General Krueger's US Sixth Army invasion from Lingayen , Admiral Iwabuchi believed that the main American effort would come from the south, and prepared his strongest defenses accordingly. General Swing had established his CP in a cathedral near Paranaque. Lieutenant Colonel Hoska, the th GFAB's commanding officer, told Swing that he believed that his pack 75s could neutralize the heavy Japanese fire coming from across the Paranaque River bridge.

Swing permitted him to try. Between midnight and on 5 February, Hoska directed rounds from a single gun in a precision attack on the Japanese defensive positions, knocking out five machine-gun emplacements and two 20mm high-velocity antiaircraft guns embedded in the concrete breakwater wall 30 yards 27 m across the river.

Admiral Iwabuchi ordered his men to blow up all of Manila's military installations and the port area, the bridges, and the municipal water and electrical power installations.

On 5 February, the Japanese dynamited the northern port area and fled southward across the Pasig River , blowing all the bridges behind them. The blasts ignited fires that quickly engulfed a section of bamboo houses near the port. Shortly, much of the northern half of Manila was in flames. On 6 February, General Swing called a halt to the th's advance. The attack, across fairly open terrain, gained little ground in the face of heavy, concentrated, and accurate Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire.

By 11 February, the 11th Airborne Division had consolidated its gains. It had established a solid line from the northwest to the southeast corners of Nichols Field and had eliminated the Japanese from the west end of the airfield. The division had been unable to substantially reduce the volume of Japanese artillery fire from the Nichols Field defensive complex.

Airstrikes from Mindoro and the division's artillery had failed to knock out enough of the Japanese guns at the airfield to permit the infantry to advance without severe losses. Nichols Field was the center of the Genko Line and contained an interconnecting network of concrete pillboxes and gun emplacements linked by underground tunnels. The terrain around the airfield was open, providing the Japanese with excellent fields of fire for their flat-trajectory dual-purpose antiaircraft weapons.

The Japanese had embedded several naval guns on the airfield's outer rim. He died on 22 February during an air evacuation flight from Mindoro to New Guinea. Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. On 12 February, Swing ordered a full-scale assault on Nichols Field. Under cover of continuing artillery barrages, the infantry rushed forward to attack pillboxes and gun emplacements. In the afternoon, the Japanese counterattacked and were beaten back.

The 11th Airborne Division continued its advance on 13 February. The platoon crossed a dry streambed and started up the slope of the other side — first yards 91 m , then yards m — and still no Japanese reaction. Suddenly, Japanese machine guns located in the streambed that 1st Platoon had just crossed opened up on the platoon's rear. Fortunately, the platoon was well dispersed. Before any return fire could be brought to bear on the machine gun locations, a shouting, screaming mass of Japanese climbed out of the streambed and charged 1st Platoon.

The platoon's machine-gun crews had their weapons mounted and firing within seconds. Their fire, combined with that of the BARs began knocking the Japanese down. They still came on in a seemingly endless stream. The leading Japanese closed with 1st Platoon and all semblance of organization vanished as it became every man for himself. They knocked out several Japanese machine guns in the streambed that had ceased firing because their fire was masked by their own troops.

Leaving a squad to continue up the streambed, the remainder of 2nd Platoon crossed the streambed and entered the melee. For some unknown reason, the Japanese chose not to fight it out but attempted to pass through 1st Platoon to reach the shelter of their bunkers and pillboxes.

Suddenly, without warning, a muffled explosion shook the area and the earth on top of the hill rose and settled, knocking most of the men to the ground. Preferring death to the disgrace of capture, the Japanese had blown the position while the Americans were on top of it, expecting the whole hill to be destroyed and killing everyone on it. Fortunately, the demolition charge was too small. The 11th Airborne Division had now seized two-thirds of the Genko Line. With the seizure of Nichols Field, the division, for the most part, had completed its objective in the battle for Manila.

Since its amphibious landing at Nasugbu, the division had suffered casualties. The division had killed about 3, Japanese in metropolitan Manila. General Swing's plan was simple: blast the Japanese defenses with airstrikes and artillery, attack the blind sides and vulnerable points, squeeze the Japanese tighter, and, if they tried to escape, hit the escape routes with airstrikes and artillery, or previously-set ambush sites.

Between 15 and 17 February, the division consolidated its gains. On 16 February, during a reconnaissance of the eastern approaches to Fort McKinley, there was an enormous explosion that demolished the side of a hill. The concussion knocked some of the men flat. One explosion followed another as the Japanese destroyed their ammunition dumps.

As they closed on the fort, the artillery, antiaircraft, mortar, and small-arms fire from emplacements and pillboxes increased. Japanese suicide squads fought desperate delaying actions, but American casualties were comparatively light. Just inside the Carabao Gate, the main entrance to Fort McKinley, the attack was halted by division order; elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division had crossed the Pasig River and were working toward the division from the northeast corner of the post.

The Japanese had withdrawn to a new concentration area in the vicinity of Mabato Point. From their well-fortified strongpoint on top of Mabato Point, the Japanese had perfect observation and wide, grazing fields of artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire over open and rolling terrain. Tunnels were burrowed through the hill, opening into large rooms containing headquarters, communications centers, hospitals, supply rooms, kitchens, and living quarters.

A Japanese soldier could move between positions without surfacing. Pearson deployed his forces in an arc surrounding Mabato Point. Colonel Pearson launched his attack at midmorning on 18 February. After reassessing the situation, Pearson decided to call in airstrikes and all the artillery fire he could bring to bear on the targets.

The ground around the Japanese defensive positions was so hard that the aerial bombs merely chipped off pieces of the fortification; the artillery and tank fire was even less effective.

Pearson then called for napalm airstrikes. The napalm did two things: it burned off the camouflage covering the cave and tunnel entrances, and when landing near a tunnel opening, burned up so much oxygen so rapidly that many Japanese suffocated inside the tunnels.

Mabato Point was attacked again on the morning of 19 February. The rifle company Pocket Hole Jig Nz Mitre 10 King made its way partially up the hill and, again, was blasted off the hill by huge mm mortars. Finally, several Japanese were spotted in trees.

Sharpshooters were brought up and knocked the Japanese out of the trees. The mortar fire subsequently abated. By 21 February, the Japanese on Mabato Point were surrounded and cut off from their escape routes. Patrol boats were sent out on Laguna Lake to block the Japanese escape by water. The girl asked Pearson if a Japanese medical officer could surrender. When asked for the whereabouts of the Japanese officer, she pointed to one of the "guerillas," a nondescript little individual who promptly surrendered.

Through an interpreter, the Japanese officer stated that there were perhaps more Japanese in the Mabato Point area that would surrender unconditionally if given the chance. Pearson ordered a ceasefire and sent a Filipino messenger under a white flag of truce to the Japanese commander on Mabato Point.

At noon, all fire would be halted for a half hour and any Japanese defenders who wished to surrender should walk out with their hands over their heads and move down the hill toward the American lines. The Japanese commander rejected the offer out of hand. Pearson resumed the attack at with airstrikes, artillery concentrations, and tank fire. The Japanese attempted to repel the assault, but finally, the ground forces who were advancing along the arc of the attack assaulted the position with rifles, grenades, flamethrowers, and fixed bayonets.

That night, the 15 surviving Japanese officers marched on their commander's order to Mabato Point and committed harakiri. On 21 February, the Americans moved without opposition to Mabato Point. The tranquility would be short-lived. The Japanese were far from defeated in the Philippines. Griswold 's XIV Corps. More specifically, this meant the reduction of the Japanese defenses on Mount Macolod on the southeastern shore of Taal Lake, the seizure of Lipa , and the clearance of Highway 19, the main route through the Lipa Corridor, for 5 miles 8.

It was clear to Swing that the Japanese were far from defeated in this area. Another force occupied the Ternate -Mount Pico de Loro sector, driven there during the 11th Airborne Division's initial drive from Nasugbu.

A large number of Japanese were holed up on the Bicol Peninsula north of Legazpi. Swing knew that his new missions would require the total commitment of his seven-infantry-battalion division. At no time since the division entered combat did he ever have the luxury of units in reserve. Some of his battalions, through combat losses, were at a present-for-duty strength of just over effectives. But Swing knew his division and his subordinate commanders, and he knew how to employ them effectively.

The th RCT had not yet operated as a stand-alone RCT on Luzon; its two infantry battalions were usually attached to one of the other RCTs, proving the need for a triangular regimental organization in which the regiment's main body was composed of three maneuver battalions as with the th RCT , rather than a square regimental organization with two battalions.

In March, the th RCT fought as a stand-alone regiment. The regiment sent out recon patrols to gather intelligence on the Japanese defensive positions dug in on Mount Sungay to its east. While the infantrymen and artillerymen were fighting the ground battles, the combat engineers were carving out roads along the cliffs and defiles in the rugged mountainous terrain around Taal Lake with their small glider-borne bulldozers. One of the roads that they constructed was along a steep, sheer cliff on the north side of the lake.

General Swing reasoned that if the th RCT moved down this cliff and took up position on the th RCT's right flank, it would gain much terrain for which the regiment would otherwise have had to fight by moving overland above it. The northern arm of the pincers in southern Luzon began to move on 7 March when the th RCT descended the steep southern slopes of Tagaytay Ridge to the northern shore of Taal Lake.

Turning eastward, the th RCT met no opposition until, on the afternoon of 8 March, the lead elements came under heavy mortar and automatic-weapons fire from Japanese defenses about yards m west of a hill 2 miles 3. With the aid of close-air and artillery support, it took three days of heavy fighting on the north side of the hill for the th RCT to overrun these defenses on 11 March. This key Japanese position consisted of a fortress of pillboxes surrounding a concrete water tank.

On top of the hill, the th RCT routed the Japanese out of an underground garrison of large, interconnected caves in which many Japanese were sealed when the exits collapsed. The th RCT's first task was to reduce the Japanese defenses on Mount Bijiang, a rough peak located at the northwestern corner of the Mount Makiling hill mass and controlling Routes 1 and 21 for about 5 miles 8.

Thereafter, supporting airstrikes and artillery reduced the defenses, which Filipino guerrillas finally overran on 19 March. Meanwhile, other elements of the th RCT had moved eastward along Route 21 to a point about 3 miles 4. Therefore, until 23 March, the two RCTs mopped up in the areas they already held, warded off numerous small-scale Japanese counterattacks, patrolled to locate Japanese defenses, and directed air and artillery bombardments on Japanese positions Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division relieved both units on 23 March.

The th RCT made somewhat better progress. The th RCT then drove eastward against negligible opposition, cleared the northern shores of Balayan and Batangas Bays , and, on 11 March, reached Batangas City, on the northeastern shore of Batangas Bay. The th RCT had to clear the peninsula to assure the security of the northern side of the Verde Island Passage and to make the shores of Balayan and Batangas Bays safe for base development. In an operation marked by minor shore-to-shore operations by both Japanese and American units, the Americans cleared the peninsula by 16 March.

Numbering some 1, men in all, the Japanese had the support of a mm artillery howitzer , two 70mm guns , ten or more 81mm mortars , a few lighter mortars, and a wealth of machine guns and automatic cannons, including many removed from disabled Japanese aircraft at the Lipa airstrips. The th RCT, launching an attack at Mount Macolod on 19 March, had the support of two mm and two mm artillery battalions.

From 19 through 23 March, the th RCT overran the Japanese outer defenses east of the road and southeast of Mount Macolod, which lay west of the road. Additionally, the th RCT captured Cuenca. Simultaneously, division elements had considerably reduced the threat to its line of communication LOC posed by the Japanese units isolated west of Taal Lake, although it was 1 April before the th RCT overcame the last organized resistance in the rough hills south of Ternate.

Major David Carnahan replaced Wilson. Pearson was assuming command of the th RCT just as it was about to fight its bloodiest and, unfortunately, deadliest battle in its history — the reduction of Mount Macolod. Source citations : Flanagan Triumph in the Philippines. Mount Macolod, about 60 miles 97 km south of Manila, rises to 3, feet m on the southeastern shore of Taal Lake. The mountain's northern and western slopes rise nearly vertically from the water. On the eastern and southern slopes, the drop is also vertical from about 1, feet m ; then three ridges descend gradually to the base of the mountain.

Two of these ridges lead onto the highway that passes through Cuenca and the barrio of Dita. The north-south Cuenca ridge would become known as Brownie Ridge and the east-west Dita ridge would become known as Bashore Ridge, named after the th RCT infantry company commanders that assaulted them.

Brownie Ridge was the strongest Japanese position on the mountain and was honeycombed with tunnels and caves. The third ridge connected Mount Macolod to Bukel Hill, a lesser projection about yards m east of the mountain. In the saddle between Mount Macolod and Bukel Hill, on the northeastern side of the mountain, the Japanese had constructed another defensive position. Beneath camouflage and foliage, the area bristled with artillery and automatic weapons carefully aimed and emplaced to cover all approaches with interlocking fields of fire.

On the night of 23 March, a Filipino guerrilla patrol had probed a Japanese position east of Dita and lost six men in a firefight. The tanks leveled the houses in the area and the combat engineers deactivated land mines as the two rifle companies swept the outskirts of Dita. Northwest of the barrio, the Japanese, hidden in concealed caves, stopped the attack with heavy fire. Both rifle companies withdrew with one KIA and seven WIA after dark to defensive positions yards m south of Dita and the Japanese moved into the barrio.

Pearson understood that patrolling alone was not going to get the job done. He was opposed by a strong, well-armed, and well-concealed force, and that he needed airstrikes and massive artillery preparation to pound the Japanese before he sent his infantrymen in again. Intense Japanese defensive machine-gun fire again halted the attack. It was apparent that the Japanese were retreating into their underground tunnels during the USAAF bombing and strafing runs.

Shortly, the company came under heavy machine-gun fire that slowed its advance. Predictably, the Japanese started dropping mortar rounds. In an orderly fighting withdrawal, Ewing saved his command to fight another day. Both battalions were forced to withdraw. Their new positions now encircled the landward sides of Mount Macolod.

The Japanese performed early-morning banzai attacks that were costly to both battalions. It was obvious to Colonel Pearson that the Japanese held Talisay with a sizeable force. They did not have a chance to dig in but took cover in nearby ravines.

They moved into positions along the highway to open counter-battery fire. On 17 April, they launched an all-out attack to throw the Japanese off the mountain. The plan was to have all companies converge at the head of Cuenca Ravine. During the advance up the hill, there was little opposition. When the three companies converged, the Japanese hit them with mortar, machine-gun, and sniper fire from camouflaged positions, killing Captain Paul G.

Colonel Pearson prepared a task force for an all-out assault on Mount Macolod. He placed M18 Hellcat tank destroyers along the highway west of Dita and moved mm artillery howitzers up to the front lines where they could fire directly into cave mouths on the side of the mountain.

For three days, a campaign was waged against the Japanese on the mountain. Every second of the day and night, some type of round landed among the Japanese positions — a burst of heavy machine-gun fire, a mortar round, or an artillery round. The advance was slow and rough, especially across the bare face of Brownie Ridge, where the troops had to run and crouch through machine-gun and mortar fire. They arrived at the summit of Mount Macolod at about and attacked down the western slope.

Hand grenades were thrown down the slopes and into the caves. The Japanese ran down the slope as soon as they realized the Americans were above them and many ran out of the caves after a grenade was thrown in.

Each cave was blown shut by the engineers. Constant radio contact was maintained to keep the platoons and squads abreast and to keep from allowing the Japanese to criss-cross the American rear. The resultant fires killed many Japanese, burned off the vegetation, and prevented the Japanese from infiltrating between companies.

By 20 April, the battle for Mount Macolod was over. After Mount Macolod fell, the last remaining Japanese stronghold in the 11th Airborne Division's AO in southern Luzon was Mount Malepunyo, a hill complex covered with tangled rainforest and bamboo thickets, surrounded by precipitous slopes and interlaced with sharp ridges. The highest peak stood at 3, feet 1, m above the plains. There were no roads and only poorly-maintained jungle trails within the 30 square miles 78 km 2 area of the mountain, which required the troops to hand-carry small loads, use Filipino bearers for resupply and casualty evacuation, and two-seater artillery light observation aircraft to airdrop emergency supplies.

General Griswold felt that Mount Malepunyo was such a formidable Japanese position that he had originally planned to reduce the mountain with two divisions, the 1st Cavalry and the 11th Airborne. Late on the night of 22 April , Swing received a call from XIV Corps headquarters, informing him that, instead of getting the whole 1st Cavalry Division, he would only have the 8th Cavalry Regiment attached for the operation.

He moved the th RCT to Alaminos , north of the mountain, for an attack southward. He held the 8th Cavalry in position at the mouth of the "Grand Canyon," a gorge on the northeastern slope of the mountain.

Swing assigned the main effort to the th RCT, on the 8th Cavalry's right flank, which was to attack eastward along the Malaraya Hill canyon and then turn northward to join the th RCT. Seven artillery battalions, some organic to the 11th Airborne Division and some attached, were spread out around the base of the mountain.

Supplementing the artillery were a company of Hellcat tank destroyers, a company of Sherman tanks, and a 4. The artillerymen of D Battery, th PFAB, broke down their pack 75s and lugged them up the side of the mountain to fire at the caves. At dawn on 27 April, General Swing launched his attack.

The artillery, located around the base and sides of the mountain, fired some 5, mixed-caliber rounds in front of the infantry.

The th RCT's paratroopers positioned themselves close to the airstrike impact points because they observed that the Japanese scampered to their caves when they heard the approaching planes and, immediately after the bombing runs, moved out of their caves to man their fighting positions.

Being so near, the th RCT killed many Japanese as they left their caves and bunkers. On 30 April, after more air and artillery strikes, and after a bloody fight, the th RCT was on Mount Malepunyo's high ground. The th RCT swept the slopes to flush out the last Japanese remnants. Patrols found large caves interconnected by wire communications and stocked with large ammunition and supply stores.

Captured documents confirmed that the mountain fortress was the last stronghold of the Japanese southern Luzon defense force. Siedenberg, a veteran of Leyte and Luzon. On 3 May, Siedenberg's squad was pinned down by heavy Japanese automatic-weapons fire. One of his men was wounded in the opening burst and fell, exposed to more Japanese fire. Siedenberg was hit in the chest as he crawled across the open ground to the wounded man, but he crawled on, gathered up the wounded man, and turned back to cover with the rest of his squad.

On the way back, he was hit twice more but continued to crawl and carry the wounded man to safety. Back with his squad, Siedenberg died of his wounds. He was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his gallantry. After the war and during the Occupation of Japan, the 11th Airborne Division's first post on Hokkaido was named Camp Siedenberg in his honor. The German act of military surrender to the Allies was signed on 7 May. The operation had two parts: Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet.

Set to begin on 1 November , Operation Olympic was the invasion of Kyushu , the southernmost main Japanese island. On 1 March would come Operation Coronet, the planned invasion of Honshu , the largest and most populous main Japanese island. Airfields on Kyushu captured in Operation Olympic would allow land-based air support for Operation Coronet.

MacArthur had the troops. At the time, there were 1. Ridgway to jump onto the Boso Peninsula forming the eastern side of Tokyo Bay and establish a beachhead for the amphibious landing of several armored divisions. By 10 May, the 11th Airborne division had regrouped and established a base camp on the outskirts of Lipa. During May, replacements began to arrive. It has a hard-rolling action with a traditional Rapala square lip for unique deflections.

Some fishing conditions require special features from the bait. Unique and intricate shapes, durability, varied rattle sounds, translucency and sinking, rising and neutral buoyancy are all a part of features that sometimes define success.

In a word, essential lures to have. Keel belly combined with tail weighted balance allows the lure to cut quick with the snap of the rod, ending with a soft, long glide on slack line. Hard vibrating action accented with loud, distinctive BB rattle system. Long-casting with variable running depth.

The Ultra Light Minnow acts like a big bait, but in a small weighted body. It casts incredibly far, is slow-sinking; and creates a hard-kicking action through its unique lip design. Custom-designed cup face to move a lot of water and create a big bubble on each twitch. Weighted for super casting distance the Ultra Light Shad runs true even at high retrieve speeds and fast water. Tight wobbling swimming action with slow-sinking on pause. Fast floating. Floating, buoyant body easily backs out of cover when paused.

Though small in size, the Ultra Light Crank is weighted and designed to cast like a lure twice its size. Eternal scale pattern and holographic 3D eye for a life-like appearance. The rattle chamber transmits sound waves that amplify through the water.

Metallic, painted or glass patterns with unmatchable neutral bouyancy on stall. Cast it against deep drops and roll it back, as the lure quickly dives to its casting depth of close to 3 meters.

Its jointed tail section creates a slightly exaggerated action which helps to trigger otherwise disinterested or tentative fish. The heavy-duty wide-gap single hook has a metallic weed guard that protects the hook from weeds and snags, making the lure ideal for fishing heavy cover and through reeds and weeds. Wide, irregular sweeping action to create flash. Internal rattle chamber emits additional noise and vibration. Built with a heavy-duty single hook and a weed guard to be fished even in heavy cover.

Balanced flutter on the drop with irregular kicks and strong body roll. Originally built for winter fishing, the balanced jigging lures have an excellent reputation and track record among ice fishermen with new designs to expand their performance into various actions, deeper depths and stronger currents.

But over time these lures have found their way also into the tackle boxes of open water fishermen; first to vertical jigging and then to various cast and retrieve applications.

Single reversed hooks with center treble and eyelet, this bait can also be bottom bounced, yo-yo style off the bottom with unbeatable results.

Extremely effective in cold waters or when predators are feeding on small bait. Rapala offers a full range of tools and accessories from pliers to scales, landing nets and fillet knives. The classic to modern designs reinforce our commitment to style and functional design. Tools and Accessories Rapala offers a full range of tools and accessories from pliers to scales and landing nets and fillet knives. Reversible MagSpring locks the pliers in closed position when not in use and when reversed, act as a spring to hold the jaws open and ready.

Replaceable carbide cutters for braided, monofilament and fluorocarbon line and wire up to 15 lbs. Hybrid jaws with an interlocking front grid for a secure grip on hooks. Crimping tool to help rigging. Comes with a neoprene sheath and a coil lanyard. Built with two internal, opposing magnets to hold the pliers open, there are no springs that could break, rust or lose their elasticity.

The Mag Spring offers smooth, one hand operation and will not fail even in the harshest conditions. Reversible MagSpring uses magnetic force both ways: to hold the pliers shut when not in use — and with a flick of a finger, the magnet can be reversed to hold the pliers open. Built with two opposing magnets to hold the pliers open, the Mag Spring mechanism cannot fail, unlike conventional plier springs.

The cutter on both sizes cuts all line sizes. The pliers feature stainless steel jaws and co-molded grips. The durable stainless steel jaws with gun metal finish have serrated tips for secure grip. Ergonomic, co-molded Soft Grip handles for comfortable hold. Patented design. The easy release lock-back design fixes the blade safely in place when being used, while the no slip soft grip handle with built in safety guard provides maximum blade control.

Model No. Will never rust. A great choice for all cutting purposes. Compression sheath. Ergonomic, no slip Soft Grip handle has a safety finger guard for secure and safe grip.

Technical, high compression sheath holds the knife securely. A spring-loaded, single-hand operation tool for intricate work and precise cuts. With its off-set shears, these scissors excel in cutting micro super lines and all other non-wire fishing lines.

A sliding lock secures the blades closed for safe storage. Two super sharp stainless steel blades retract into the surrounding casing when the triggers are released, only exposing the blades when in use. A built in carabiner allows you to keep these scissors close by at all times. RCD Knife Sharpener Easy to use knife sharpener for knives and fillets with a two-stage process: First the black sharpener for coarse sharpening on very dull knives, then the fine-tuning finishing touches for a razor sharp cutting edge with the white sharpener.

Co-molded grip for secure hold. RCD Magnetic Release Powerful magnetic release with a carabiner clip is ideal for hanging nets and other big tools and accessories to fishing jackets or vests. Break-away magnets allow easy one hand operation, releasing the hung tool with one pull. The magnets also make the re-attaching quick and easy.

Anodized aluminum body with a quick-release gate. Non load bearing, not for climbing. Sleek, modern design offers compact size with big performance. Aerator mixes air into water, keeping bait alive for extended time. Operates with 3 C batteries and aerates 1. Operates with 6 AA batteries and aerates 1. Four different tuning slot sizes to match various gauge wires. Nonslip rubber grip, stainless steel construction.

Lanyard hole. Zinc carabiner rotates degrees for ease of use. Available with black or transparent housing. Durable stainless steel body endures extended use. Lightweight construction and ergonomic design for easy operation. Built in bottle opener at the tail end of the tool. Built of durable stainless steel, the RCD Mini Clipper features an ergonomic, curved design for easy use.

Built in bottle opener at the tail end of the tool adds a recreational function. Spring-loaded forceps designed to be operated with mittens or thick gloves on as there are no finger holes to deal with. Locking ratchet clap and serrated jaws guarantee a secure grip and easy one hand operation. Durable stainless steel jaws have line scissors at the base. No mittens required for safe and comfortable summer operation. Dual-directional motor for comfortable left- and right-hand use. Operates on 2 AA batteries.

This one hand, stainless steel, spring operated hook remover gives maximum hold on hooks when removing them from fish. Hook-centering groove ensures non-slip grip of your hook.

The thick, forged head stays strong against the biggest of hooks and strongest fish. Drainage holes help to keep it rust-free. Rod-mounted line counter for trolling and deep sea fishing, designed to work with baitcasting and spinning rods. Depth alarm will sound when desired depth is reached. Digital display with backlight has both metric and imperial options.

Secure mounting system. Battery status indicator. Spring-loaded retractable tape measure is easy to store and use. The tape measure extends to cm and features large, easy to see numbers with one cm increments and highlighted indicators every 10 cm.

The UV and waterproof material has a non-reflective surface to make sure the fish length shows properly in photos even with a flash. Double screens — one on each side of the scale — show weight simultaneously to both angler and camera.

Durable two-handed construction to ease lifting heavy loads and ergonomic handle design for secure hold. Metric and imperial units. A 12 kg mechanical scale with an easy to read clock face dial. Textured body for secure hold even when weighing big fish.

Durable stainless steel hook. The scale has an easy to read LCD display and shows min, max and total weight of stored catch data. Weight can be shown in kilograms or pounds. Soft Grip coating on the body for secure hold. The top loop features a built-in bottle opener. Mechanical tube scale with durable stainless steel spring, hook and handle.

The housing is made of anodized aluminum. Comfortable Soft Grip handle for safe hold. The scale has both kilogram and pound increments, and a marker slide shows maximum weight after weighing fish.

The handle features a built-in bottle opener. Line and hook side cutter. Nickel plated carbon steel construction for years of rust resistant service. Light color co-molded grips for comfort with a double leaf spring for ease of use and convenience. Split shot crimper, Rapala lure tuning tool and light duty side cutters are also featured. Available in 12 piece bulk. Length Item Description. Light color co-molded handles offer comfortable sure grip.

Stainless steel construction. Heavy Duty Split Ring Pliers Offset tool design makes fast work of changing out split rings and hooks. Large, spring loaded handle makes one hand operation easy. Serrated cutting edge is specially designed to grip and hold tough braided line for easy, non-slip cutting. Stainless steel construction with oversized finger holes for ease of use.

Mounting instructions included. Machine washable, drip dry. Not for use as a fillet glove. Compact handle allows for quick and easy control and comes with a coil wrist lanyard.

Comfort Handle allows for secure grip. Lanyard ready. Made from highcarbon steel, protected with a silicone treatment for extra corrosion resistance. Comfortable plastic handle. Made for filleting and steaking big game fish, this no flex razor-sharp blade with ergonomic co-molded handle is the first choice of deck hands and seasoned veterans of the salt. Polished progressively tapered corrosion resistant blade made by Marttiini with European stainless steel takes and holds an ultra-sharp edge.

Functional vented sheath allows for quick drying. This medium flex, sturdy razor sharp blade has enough flexibility for tight areas, precision cuts and fine detail.

Made by Marttiini with corrosionresistant European stainless steel, known to take and hold an ultra-sharp edge. Progressively tapered blade with a polished finish is fitted with an ergonomically designed, co-molded handle for a comfortable grip. Vented sheath allows for quick drying. Slim, medium flex blade provides the maximum flexibility for working in tight areas, precision cuts and super fine detail.

Progressively tapered blade with a polished finish; and ergonomically designed, co-molded handle with a comfortable grip. Made by Marttiini with corrosion-resistant European stainless steel for extended service. The Mini Digital Scale measures up to 25 kg with precision accuracy. An angler favorite; it easily fits in glove box, tacklebox or coat pocket. Digital scale powered by one lithium coin battery included includes tare weight function and 4 minute auto shutoff.

Measures in kilograms or pounds. Large display. Stainless steel hook is rust resistant allowing years of untiring service. Measures in both kilograms and pounds. Compact Touch Screen 25 kg Scale Ease and convenience in weighing and tracking your catch in a compact size. Eight storage bins for storing individual catch weight. Total bin weight is constantly displayed, with the option to see the weight in each bin.

Easy to operate, it also includes back light illumination for low light and night fishing. Compact size for convenient storage in tacklebox, pocket or boat glove box. Just hang your catch on the stainless steel hook and in seconds get an accurate reading.

Has memory to track weight totals. Touch Screen Scale Large, feature packed digital touch screen scale to weigh and record your catch and store the individual weights in eight storage bins. Shows also the total weight of the stored catch. Kilogram and pound display options. Runs up to hours on two AA batteries. Back-up memory retains stored data if battery power is lost.

The most popular size pliers, these curved nose models help get at hard to reach hooks. Nickel plated carbon steel, they include split shot crimper, a side cutter and a double leaf spring for easy, one-handed operation.

Also includes handy Patented Rapala lure tuning tool. Special features not found in other pliers. Mini Pliers Compact needle nose pliers are perfect size to store in pocket or tacklebox. Spring loaded for one hand operation with co-molded handles for comfort. These Split Ring Pliers make it a snap to change out or replace hooks.

Soft grip handles and wrist lanyard. A trick picked up from the competition fishing where every wasted moment potentially costs you money. Simply mount this convenient holder to any seat post and have instant access to the tools of your choice. Hook and loop strap secures tools in place for running.

The Magnetic Tool Holder securely holds your tools in place so that you will always know where to find them. Fishing Accessories Side Planer The side planer can be operated on both sides of the boat by switching the trigger placement. Traction can be adjusted by re-positioning the line snaps. Each foot of line is measured as it passes through counter. Auto line release.

Tension knob. Lighted display. Fast and easy attachment to boat rail, deck or gunwale. Rod Tip Protector Designed to protect delicate rod tips from guide damage and breaking during transportation.

Heavy-duty nylon construction with built-in fiberglass reinforcements. Overall length 39 cm. Fishing Forceps Must-have tool for removing hooks, rigging and knot tying.

Built-in scissors, oversize thumb holes and hand lanyard. Fish Priest Keep your catch as fresh as possible by dispatching it quickly and humanely with the Fish Priest. One piece construction with heavy brass and no slip handle. Plastic Fish Holder Easily land large, toothy fish without harm to you or your catch. Easily inserts and holds fish. Fluorescent screw for easy location at night. Super Line Scissors Grips braided line for non-slip cutting.

Serrated cutting edge. Oversized finger holes. EZ Stow Braided Line Scissor Retractable design features serrated cutting edge that grips and effortlessly cuts tough braided line.

Neck lanyard. Retractable design for compact storage. Fine grit Aluminum Oxide stone restores point in seconds. Enhanced stripper wheel design improves performance. Removes 1. Tool Combos Designed by fishermen for fishermen. All Rapala tools have unique features that only an angler can appreciate — available only on Rapala branded tools.

Custom chosen combinations of fishing tools and accessories offer the right set of tools to fit into the large variety of situations anglers meet daily in different environments around the globe. The perfect combo for every angler. Item Description. Impulse items offer great value and generate increased profits.

Bulk up your store with these checkout aisle champions and watch the sales Pocket Hole Jig 3d Print King add up at your register. The perfect full carbon net for trout fishing. Extremely light and compact. Simple to hang on your back using a magnetic clip and the supplied karabiner to clip to your belt for extra Pocket Hole Jig R3 Antibody security, leaving no chance of losing your net.

You will always have it ready when needed in 2 seconds! An extremely versatile full carbon net with many useful features. Can be used wading, fishing from a boat or from the bank. Perfect for all kinds of medium sized fish such as perch, large trout or aspius. Developed especially for use whilst float tube fishing — floating so your net is always ready to hand. Nice deep mesh to net those large fish, including large pike up to a meter long.

This large full carbon net is built with a 1. Can be put to great use from the bank or from a boat in both fresh or saltwater. This net is perfect for many species of fish including zander, sea bass or even salmon. This full carbon innovative design net is the answer. It has a very compact 8-piece carbon telescopic handle that extends to a full 3 m handle. With this fully foldable and full carbon net, you can safely use to net even the biggest fish without the extra burden of carrying extra weight and bulk.

Built from light weight aluminum, yet tough to handle large resistant species. The Fish Gripper Scale Series offers the great combination of functionality and performance. Design style favored by anglers the world over, the Rapala versions have special features that set them apart from the others. Pull open jaws, slip over the toothiest fish, lift and accurately measure weight on the easy-to-read spring-loaded scale. Quick release mechanism sends catch back to fight another day.

Corrosionresistant aluminum construction will provide service for years to come. Soft-grip handle gives the ultimate in slip-resistant grip and comfort while wrist lanyard ensures only the fish goes back in the sea. Weight indicated in one pound increments. Start off with rugged high-grade stainless steel construction for unmatchable toughness against fresh and saltwater environments. The digital scale allows measurements in lb. Water resistant scale runs hours on 2 AAA batteries, thanks in part to the 2 minute auto shut-off.

Wrist lanyard keeps it on board. Aluma Pro Gripper Fish grippers help handle toothy predators safely. Skeleton style anodized aluminum body is lightweight yet durable. Contoured design for comfortable use. Stainless steel jaw construction is durable and saltwater proof.

Folding hero mat for measuring fish. Made of durable, easy-to-clean material and featuring easyto read and photograph, highlighted increments with matt finish. Large easy-to-read numbers are molded into high impact plastic. Mounting bracket holes. Folds for compact storage.

Accommodates fish up to cm. Stainless steel blade, handle of curly birch and reindeer antler packaged in a Rapala Collector Tin. The hand sharpened stainless steel blade runs through the entire length of the rosewood handle for maximum strength and leverage. Finished with a bronze salmon head sculpture and scalloped ferrule. Wooden heirloom gift box adds a true sense of occasion. Incredible extra thin blade allows the greatest flexibility and control ever.

PTFE non-stick coating lets fillets effortlessly fall away. Razor-sharp handground stainless steel blade features through tang construction. Polished brass ferrule. Tooled leather sheath. The original, this series includes four blade sizes, one for every cleaning chore. Progressively tapered, full-tang blades of Scandinavian stainless steel take and hold an ultra-sharp edge. Birch handle and a fine tooled leather Laplander sheath.

Includes easy-to-use single-stage sharpener to keep blade razor sharp. Updated nordic design creates a modern classic. Brown laminated handle features a polished stainless steel blade.

Grey laminated handle has PTFE coated blade. Progressive tapered blade, through tang construction for leverage. Coordinated genuine leather tooled sheath, snap closure. Sheath: Genuine Tooled Leather. Blade: Handground European Stainless Steel. Actual blade length may vary slightly due to hand craftsmanship. The famous Rapala flexible blade with a no-slip, soft grip handle for filleting comfort. Enlarged finger guard for added safety.

Comes complete with coordinated black textured sheath. Includes singlestage sharpener. Soft Grip handle and heavyweight blade provide increased cutting power. Tooth knife back is just the right tool for sawing through tough bones or for scaling your catch. Handle: Thermoplastic Soft Grip. Sheath: Artificial Leather. Blade: Handground Stainless Steel. Progressive double taper design offers concentrated cutting power from the tang to tip of the blade. Blade Length. Effortlessly fillet with scalloped blade and non-stick PTFE treated blade.

Scallops introduce air between blade and fish to prevent sticking and tearing. A wide, easyclean ventilated sheath. Handle: Textured Thermoplastic. Sheath: Easy-Clean Snap Sheath. Handle: High Strength Polymer. Sheath: Molded Resin with Built-in Sharpener. Blade: Stainless Steel. Includes easy-clean open sheath. Handle Length.

Super sharp stainless steel blade for years of service. Flexible tip for delicate work. Easy-clean sheath. Ventilated sheath. Sheath: Easy Clean Open Sheath. Hawk Fillet Knife Contoured hard plastic handle with textured finish for sure grip and substantial finger guard to protect against slips. Stainless steel blade is flexible enough for the most delicate filleting projects yet stout enough for steaking.

Each knife is protected by easy clean open sheath.



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Comments to “Pocket Hole Jig 3d King”

  1. IP:
    Mind with a 3-year warranty on the this is helpful if you are looking.
  2. aci_hayat:
    PayPal, collection wooden box was for my hamster wood slats. Fixed.