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The analysis is based on a number of capital and operating scenarios over a ten-year timeframe unlike the NPV analysis discussed earlier, which looked at the through-life costs over 25 years. The implications associated with the following scenarios clearly extend outside this timeframe and, therefore, need to be considered in the appropriate context.
Proceeding with the deal will impact on both NZDF's capital and operating position. As outlined earlier, both are currently under considerable pressure. Table 2 compares the capital injections required for all Priority 1 projects in the year Capital Plan A with the capital injections required for retaining the A-4s and replacing them as originally planned B. The difference in the table illustrates the capital injection requirement of going ahead with F deal.
However, this does not include forecasted capital injections for replacement of the Skyhawks as these fall outside the timeframe of the table. They impact on the following three to four years. Two operating comparisons are made, using the figures based on total output costs of the Air Combat Force less capital charge and rounded to the nearest million dollars.
They differ from the figures presented in the July Cabinet paper. Since then, more up-to-date information and more robust operating assumptions have been included. However the figures in the tables are forecast cost estimates only and are sensitive to changes in depreciation calculated on the aircraft's capital cost.
The upgrades have been included on the assumption that the weapons and systems obtained would be transferred to the replacement aircraft.
This shows the Skyhawk minimum capability scenario as the lower-cost option. However, the comparison between the two scenarios needs to be carefully considered within the context of the assumptions underlying them, as they are very different.
Negotiations with the Philippines are the most advanced. Timing of the disposal is important if the Government is to gain the best possible sale price. Delaying the sale will reduce the sale price, as the aircraft will be less attractive to buyers because of older airframes and greater usage.
Cancellation of the F contract raises questions over the future of the air combat capability. Decisions and the costs associated with the disposal of the Skyhawks will be affected by these options.
However, these items would not be required if the Skyhawks were retained and not deployed to other than low intensity conflict situations, or the air combat force were disbanded. Cancelling the lease and support package would free up funding both operating and capital already committed or that is to be committed to the project approximating the differences shown between A and B in each of the relevant Tables.
The major savings resulting from eliminating the air combat capability would be operating costs. There would, however, be a capital impact based on terminating the F lease; disposing of the Skyhawks, the Macchi trainers and a base probably Whenuapai ; and relocating to Ohakea. This cost could be offset by a financial gain through unwinding the DMO hedging arrangement. However, the figure from unwinding is sensitive to the exchange rate and could therefore result in either a gain or a cost to New Zealand.
The implications on the current Defence Capital Plan of eliminating the air combat capability can be seen in Table 5 which compares the capital injections required for all Priority 1 projects, including the Fs A with the capital injections required if the air combat capability were eliminated entirely B.
The difference in the level of capital injections is not solely linked to the removal of the F and the air combat capability. In addition to the reduction of the cost of acquiring the capability there is also a reduction in the level of depreciation funding attached to each of the assets. This explains why the removal of the Fs and the air combat capability from the capital acquisition process does not have a dollar-for-dollar impact on the level of NZDF-wide capital injections required.
It may also result in some redundancies. These savings also take into account the costs of relocating to Ohakea but do not include income from the sale of real estate. Depreciation in this context is an operating saving. Capital charge is the levy on the Crown's investment in this capability. Based on previous restructuring experience within elements of the NZDF these savings might take two to three years to be achieved.
The implications of deferral would depend largely on discussions with the United States and the length of time of deferral.
The terms of reference did not extend to consultations with other governments. Discussions were also held with other relevant individuals. In my view, there are two ways of considering military and defence policy; either in terms of what a country has to do to please others; or what is right for that country in terms of "enlightened self-interest".
The DB report adopted the latter approach and saw our armed forces' combat capability as just one way of securing an external environment in which New Zealand flourishes. For a country to influence others, it needs to not only have its say, but also be listened to. In pure defence terms, this means being judged on what you can do today with credit, rather than on what you might be able to do in five to ten years' time.
To perform with credit the NZDF has to have good personnel and equipment, and - amongst other things - have access to quality intelligence, training, exercises, and funding mechanisms.
East Timor has seen a paradigm shift at the strategic level. For us, it is essential to have access to the big boys for information and training. New Zealand has to show that it can preserve a defence force and make it work.
It's all about credibility. You have to be credible to be accepted". Cancellation as opposed to confirmation or amendment would have consequences for New Zealand's relations with Australia and the United States. Other relationships are unlikely to be materially affected. The Australian Government pays close attention to defence and is disinclined to quarantine it from the wider relationship with New Zealand.
The speed and strength of New Zealand's East Timor deployment will have reinforced the view that what New Zealand does, or doesn't do in the defence area, is important for Australia.
In a joint statement on future directions in CDR dated 27 March , the then Ministers of Defence announced that the programme of co-operative activities was designed to "address the full spectrum of defence activities".
New Zealand and Australia, in other words, have committed themselves to co-operate on all defence questions. Underpinning this is the strategic reality that any military threat to New Zealand would also be a threat to Australia, and vice versa. Australia looks to New Zealand for a defence force that enables New Zealand to meet its own defence policy goals and contribute to the joint goals of both countries under CDR. It follows that whether or not New Zealand leases-to-buy Fs under the present project is not of key importance to Australia.
The key factor is whether funds made available from a cancellation are then explicitly committed for other defence priorities. However, a major decision to for example abandon New Zealand's Air Combat Force would be a legitimate matter requiring full and early consultation with Australia not only in terms of CDR, but also because of its potential impact on Australia's defence relations with the United States.
The F package involves more than merely upgrading a major combat capability. It appears to reflect a conscious decision by the US Administration to re-define defence relations with New Zealand and to enable us to play - in its eyes - a more effective role in regional security. The deal is also attractive financially.
From a New Zealand perspective, a lesser number of aircraft would be more relevant to our defence requirements and financial circumstances; would maintain our improved defence relationship with the United States; and may well provide future opportunities for the NZDF to enhance its capabilities and improve its performance.
America's reaction to a cancellation of the project would be mitigated by any decision to reallocate the money saved from the F project to other defence priorities, particularly those which improved New Zealand's ability to work with it and Australia.
The United States is therefore likely to pay attention to the result of a broader review of defence policy. A key consideration will be whether or not the overall level and direction of defence expenditure is affected.
It would be desirable, in the event of a decision to cancel, to be able to emphasise that overall defence expenditure would not be reduced; to point to areas where specific enhancements will be accelerated; and, to confirm New Zealand's commitment to regional and global peacekeeping operations. One of the options available to the Government is to cancel the F contract, retain the Skyhawk fleet either at a minimum maintenance level or in an upgraded state, and vary the numbers of Skyhawks actually flown.
This, however - on the basis of advice received and assessed during the review - is considered tantamount to disbanding the RNZAF's air combat capability.
The Skyhawk is an ageing aircraft in terms of airframe, engine and systems. Its design is 50 years old. When the aircraft were first bought by New Zealand in , they had an estimated life of 15 to 20 years. Current plans call for retirement starting around Work on determining the finite airframe life stopped when the F project was approved.
The actual structural and economic life of the aircraft would have to be assessed in a reactivated life-of-type study. The Skyhawks have a number of systems that are becoming increasingly difficult and costly to support. Engine spares are becoming harder to source as worldwide usage nears its end. Safe Air Ltd has, however, provided a written guarantee to a prospective purchaser of the Skyhawks that it can provide:.
This covers most of the structural work as well as that on avionics, the fuel system, ejection seats and cockpit displays. Variable as well as fixed maintenance costs would tail off in the years towards retirement. In addition to the expenditure require for maintenance and supportability, targeting pods and electronic counter measures ECM capability are increasingly regarded as essential for deployment into other than the most benign environments.
More importantly, there are doubts in NZDF about the value of carrying out these systems upgrades on the Skyhawks because of the aircrafts' limited life and the technical risks and costs of integrating them without flight certification.
What is clear, is that the resale value of the Skyhawks is greater now, while the aircraft remains in service in other parts of the world, rather than in when the fleet is likely to be worth, in effect, only salvage and spares value.
The Skyhawk in its Kahu configuration, as currently equipped, is however regarded as a good entry-level air combat aircraft. If the F project continues, New Zealand could retain an air combat capability for another 20 to 30 years, with an aircraft vastly more capable than the present Skyhawks.
This enhancement would be achieved at a price - in terms of the existing contract and the number of aircraft involved - because of accelerated capital expenditure, extra operating costs and the project's impact on other NZDF expenditure priorities.
These issues are discussed in earlier terms of reference. If the air combat capability were lost, it is unlikely to be revived in the medium to long term. Any decision to dispense with it should therefore be taken only after a wider review of New Zealand's defence and security interests. This would require consideration of our real security priorities; an examination of the strategic setting and the inherent threats to New Zealand and New Zealand's interests; a consideration of the military implications; agreement on defence objectives; the determination of priorities for those objectives on the basis of their relevance to New Zealand both domestically and internationally; and the identification of the military capabilities necessary to drive those objectives within available finances.
As discussed earlier, part of this exercise should involve consultation with Australia under CDR. The air combat capability also needs to be seen in a broader context. On one hand, it provides the Government with choice in responding to international security and peacekeeping operations, particularly if the capability is upgraded.
On the other hand, the savings in operating and capital costs from disbanding the air combat capability could be applied to other more urgent NZDF priorities.
What has become apparent, however, is the feasibility of acquiring fewer Fs to retain a core air combat capability. The basic air combat unit is four aircraft and from that, a range of fleet strengths can be extrapolated. Allied to this is a possible reduction in air combat force bases from two currently Nowra and Ohakea to Ohakea only. As the table below shows this could generate significant savings. To this may be added savings flowing from a reduction in the Macchi jet training fleet resulting from changes to the air force flying training syllabus where only those pilots destined for the air combat force undertake jet training.
There are currently only four or five pilots progressing through this route. Another option is sale of the complete Macchi fleet and sourceing training elsewhere. One possibility is joint training with the Australians, which advice suggests, would be seriously considered.
Officials provided the following assessments, which start from a baseline of the figures supplied to the Cabinet in November when a decision was made to lease 28 Fs and operate 22, flying from two bases Ohakea and Nowra and training with the current Macchi fleet. Option B i - in the more comprehensive table shown later - uses more up-to-date figures. These tables indicate the substantial savings that can be effected by reducing F numbers to levels where skills and capabilities can be retained at a realistic level for a country of New Zealand's size and a defence force that is already under pressure to upgrade other capabilities.
The return of the Nowra detachment and consolidation of all ACF activity at Ohakea offers significant savings in output costs regardless of the level of continuing activity and is regarded as a viable scenario for all options.
Advice received is that there is no clear view at this time from the Australian Defence Force on its future training requirement.
In view of these statements, the need to maintain an air combat capability seems to be based on: demonstrating that New Zealand is serious about its own defence; sending a clear message that we are committed to broader regional and global security; and, importantly, having an operational capability that can be expanded should strategic circumstances deteriorate significantly at some point in the future.
Clearly, New Zealand does not currently need 22 operational aircraft. Menu Close. Home Features. The terms of reference are attached as an Annex. Background The Fs were acquired to replace 19 A-4 Skyhawk light attack aircraft bought in two tranches; 14 in June and a further 10 in the early s. In the foreword to his report he said: "I find this to be a long time, and while upgrades Project Kahu have meant that the aircraft has roughly kept pace with technological trends, this study has clearly shown that the Skyhawk is inadequate as an air combat capability in the modern world.
As the Australian Secretary of Defence, Dr Allan Hawke, summarised recently: "We will have to consider a more selective approach to which assets are retained and which specific capabilities we maintain".
Perhaps it is time to focus in this part of the world on the issue put so succinctly by the London Economist of 26 February at page 22 in a discussion on European defence needs: "The Europeans will need time to work out exactly who does what in ways that produce a coherent military effort, rather than just the quirky sum of the hotch-potch of national parts".
They are: the fact that the financial meter is running on the F contract; whether the F project is having an adverse impact on other urgent defence priorities; and whether the F lease locks the NZDF into a force capability of considerable cost and limited immediate utility.
These were: upgrading the Army's combat capability including: armoured vehicles, direct fire support weapons, tactical communications and general service vehicles; upgrading the Orion aircraft; improving the air combat capability of the Skyhawks; life extension of the Iroquois helicopter fleet; modification of torpedo stocks; acquisition of a fifth maritime helicopter; modifications to Charles Upham.
Information presented during the review shows that a revised year capital plan was presented to the Cabinet on 30 November with other papers, including: one for the acquisition of the F16 aircraft, which was accepted; one for the acquisition of a third ANZAC Frigate, which was rejected.
Tenders have recently been invited for armoured vehicles and replacement Landrovers, and tenders have been received for upgrading the Orions Project Sirius.
Contracts have been signed for the fifth maritime helicopter and to replace the Skyhawks with Fs. The Iroquois life extension is currently being defined. A contract has been signed for the design work associated with the conversion of the Charles Upham. Conversion is currently expected to start in late Contributing factors are: increases in project costs. Outstanding Priority 1 Projects There are currently 11 projects that were Priority 1 in November that have not yet had funds committed.
Funding Scenarios To determine what the future funding requirements might be, the NZDF has developed the following scenarios for Priority 1 projects: Scenario 1 This covers current commitments and shows the capital injections required to fund those projects where Government approval to commit funds has been given. Scenario 2 This covers current commitments plus the Army upgrade.
High priority projects without funding approval Projects considered by NZDF to be of high priority that have not yet received funding approval include for the period March to February : Army communications Army's number one priority Armoured personnel carrier APC project Light operational vehicles Landrover replacements Project Sirius Medium range anti-armour weapon Direct fire support capability Conversion of Charles Upham to a military sealift ship, or the acquisition of another vessel The first four projects alone i.
Other projects There are also a number of lower priority projects, which were approved in principle in the White Paper. Reasons for funding pressures There are several reasons for these overall pressures including: military inflation and currency changes; changes in the scope of projects; insufficient knowledge on which to base project costs; a tendency to acquire basic platforms and seek funding for add-ons later; and lumpy cash flow the smooth depreciation cash flow does not match contract payments.
For example, the Treasury has advised that the various capital expenditure scenarios outlined above are subject to a number of caveats: the information is based on that received from NZDF Resources Branch which in turn has based its calculations on the workings of an allocation model; the Treasury has not validated any of the costing information or the depreciation revenue streams inputted into the model; there is a significant information weakness related to the cash-flow of individual projects; and proceeds from the sale of NZDF properties forecast in the Defence National Real Estate Consolidation Strategy have not been included.
Absence of appropriate priority-setting mechanism Clearly, there is no significant prioritisation process in place in the NZDF, which determines whether one particular project should be approved before another. A paper prepared for the Treasury by Dr Arthur Grimes and Dr James Rolfe, completed late in , titled Defence Objectives and Funding , notes that what this approach continually fails to do, is look at the desired outcomes of defence policy and expenditure from the perspective of questions like: What does national security mean?
How best can it be achieved? What is the best balance between diplomatic and military means to achieve security? What trade-offs are there? What are appropriate roles for the armed forces? Specifically, DB stated, at page 74, "Our objective as a Committee is to propose ways of progressively strengthening the NZDF's ability to advance New Zealand's national interests in the short to medium term.
The majority of the committee went on to advocate an incremental or stepped approach to force development and saw as the first priority: "Identifying within the current force structure a useful range of options both combat and combat support to allow New Zealand to contribute: well equipped; highly trained and sustainable force elements; and at short notice to the most credible crisis-management and peace-building tasks".
The fourth and last priority was stated to be: "the maintenance of expertise and a limited operational capability in those other extant force elements of the NZDF that could possibly be needed should strategic circumstance deteriorate significantly - provided that technological developments do not in the meantime put them, as credible force elements, financially out of reach". Because there has been some misunderstanding or deliberate obfuscation of the Select Committee's views on the Army, the exact words of the majority of the Committee are repeated here: "Taking into account performance over the last decade, the strategic assessment, resource management issues, and maintaining at improved readiness, high-value interoperable force elements, we consider that the top force development priority should be deployable land force elements and the associated fixed wing, rotary wing and maritime transport capabilities necessary to support and sustain them.
In fact the then Government members on the Committee agreed that "the development of a well equipped motorised infantry force is the top priority in the re-equipping of the NZDF" and went on to urge the Government to examine whether it would be possible to shorten the time to upgrade the Army's capabilities.
These specific issues are covered later in the section headed "Terms of Reference". In terms of the "deal", New Zealand is therefore not locked into the Fs indefinitely. The changing nature of warfare The nature of warfare is undoubtedly changing rapidly. The London Economist of 18 December cites a United States Air Force officer: "In the near future, unmanned weapons systems will prevail over their manned equivalents by every indicator. On-going questioning of the air combat capability A review of this capability in New Zealand is hardly new.
In , for example, the New Zealand Defence Resource Management Review the Strategos Report considered the future of the Skyhawk and at page 62 noted that: "Equipping the aircraft and training pilots for this role is expensive, and jet aircraft were then one of the fastest growing costs of military technology.
In the same year, Dr Wayne Mapp, now MP for North Shore, published an article "Restructuring New Zealand's Defence Force" in the Spring issue of Policy , where he argued that: "Since the New Zealand armed forces do not have an independent capability in a conflict that would involve strike aircraft, the latter must be the first element to be either eliminated or integrated with the Australian armed forces". In particular, he wrote that the "present approach of maintaining virtually all elements of armed forces is wasteful and probably detracts from many of the objectives of the armed forces".
The variables were: the size of the naval combat force, with variations based on two, three and four frigates; the continuation or elimination of the air combat capability; the number and size of the regular force infantry battalions; and some variation in the size of the airlift and utility helicopter fleet.
These may be better considered as follows: Variables Option A Option C1 Option C2 Option C3 Option C4 Option D Naval Combat Force 4 frigates 3 frigates 2 frigates 2 frigates 3 frigates 2 frigates Air Combat Force Retained Eliminated Retained Eliminated Retained Eliminated Infantry Battalions 2 with 4 rifle coys 2 with 3 rifle coys 2 with 3 rifle coys 3 with 3 rifle coys - deployable brigade 2 with 3 rifle coys 2 with 3 rifle coys In the event, Cabinet chose a mix, effectively C4 plus four rifle companies in each of two battalions.
Interviewed by the Sunday Star Times of 20 April when he was a Cabinet Minister but before he took over the Defence portfolio he is reported as saying: "Instead of maintaining a fighter aircraft capability, it was more important for the defence forces to concentrate on a well-equipped navy, a modern army and an air force that contributed to maritime surveillance and air transport".
In terms of those two reports, the following needs to be emphasised: The committee was unanimous in its interim report when it ranked military capabilities in the following order of priorities - Land forces Fixed wing, rotary wing and maritime transport forces Maritime patrol forces naval and air Air strike The majority in the final report said that : "The Government's decision to replace the present air combat force with 28 F AB aircraft ahead of upgrading other military capabilities conflicts with our order of priorities.
Maritime Air Strike Unlike some other roles examined by the study, this had some military utility in responding to the security challenges that could confront New Zealand across the conflict spectrum.
The Army In contrast, the Army focused on the two roles of air interdiction and close air support. Both of these judgements are accepted. Terms of Reference The inquiry has evaluated the F lease proposal in the light of the terms of reference, and its conclusions are set out in a later section. The original offer was to sell the aircraft outright to New Zealand, but the final agreement was based on: A five-year lease with an understanding that there is a further five-year right of renewal available; An agreement to reactivate the aircraft and for the purchase of spares and services; and An option to purchase the Fs at any time during the lease.
The financial package has been structured on the basis that the option to purchase would be exercised at the end of the second lease period. The package of 28 Fs was a "take it or leave it" offer and provides more aircraft than the NZDF actually requires: "The critical mass for the air combat strike force is a squadron of 18 aircraft" Defence White Paper.
As a result, a decision was taken to fly 22 and break down the remainder for spares. The Spares and Services Agreement is supplemented by "standard terms and conditions".
Status of Contracts The contracts have been entered into between the two Governments. As regards disputes and dispute resolution, Clause 7. There is no provision equivalent to that dispute resolution wording in the lease. Nature of New Zealand's obligations Lease Agreement New Zealand has agreed to lease the F aircraft for a period of 5 years and is committed to an approximate monthly lease payment to be finalised following determination of actual use levels.
New Zealand's obligations under the lease are essentially: to maintain the aircraft; to indemnify the United States from third party claims arising out of the use etc, of the aircraft by New Zealand; and to reimburse the United States Government for all support furnished by the United States Government and to pay the costs of the United States Government in leasing the F aircraft. Spares and Services Agreement Under this agreement, New Zealand has agreed to purchase certain "spares and services".
Confirmation, amendment, deferral or cancellation If New Zealand wishes Jet Planes New Zealand Yellow to confirm the F project, it does not have to take any action in the legal sense other than to adhere to the terms and conditions of the contracts. Amendment or deferral would require re-negotiation on a Government-to-Government basis.
The basic issue, therefore, is whether at termination, and as a matter of fact: New Zealand's advance payments exceed the costs for which the United States is entitled to compensation; or New Zealand's advance payments are less than the costs for which the United States is entitled to compensation, so that a further payment by New Zealand will be required. A detailed legal opinion accompanies this report. There are a number of caveats associated with these figures: only the lease payments and the support and regeneration package are hedged; the support and regeneration services package is a current "best estimate" but is open-ended; the option to purchase may or may not be exercised; the MLU is not scheduled until the end of the year lease period.
Who pays for it will therefore depend on who owns the Fs at the time of the upgrade. This figure is also a current estimate; and there is some debate over whether the ECM pods and for that matter the targeting pods should be attributed to the F project and if so, at what cost. Value for money Prior to the November Cabinet decision to take up the US Government offer to lease 28 F aircraft, the Whineray report focused on defining New Zealand's future air combat capability requirements within the policy context of DA Categories of expenditure where commitments may accrue are as follows: United States Department of Defence DoD : Airfares, hotel accommodation and allowances for attendance at on-going reviews and definitisation conferences for approximately 30 personnel; Programme Management Personnel - Salaries and other employment related costs for six personnel thus far assigned permanently to manage the programme for the United States DoD; Activation Units - Time and material funding to cover the costs of undertaking programme planning and definitisation; and International Affairs Oversight - Partial salary and other personnel related costs for Jet Planes New Zealand Time United States Air Force International Affairs oversight.
New Zealand Ministry of Defence Travel, hotel costs and allowances for attending planning and definitisation meetings; NZ Resident Team in Utah One MOD project leader and four RNZAF personnel ; and On-going costs for: - communications; - housing Jet Planes New Zealand Nz rental; - overseas posting allowances; - utilities; - insurance; - storage of personal effects; and - medical coverage.
Through life costs, including the timing of cost increments The support payments schedule is for planning purposes only.
This section outlines the fiscal impacts of the issues raised in the following terms of reference: 5. Future options and costs The broad thrust of the terms of reference requires four options to be considered.
Capital Table 2 compares the capital injections required for all Priority 1 projects in the year Capital Plan A with the capital injections required for retaining the A-4s and replacing them as originally planned B. Cancellation Cancellation of the F contract raises questions over the future of the air combat capability.
Cancellation therefore implies one of two things - that New Zealand is willing to either: accept the risk of incurring a higher future cost of replacing the Skyhawks; or lose its air combat capability. Eliminating the Air Combat Capability ACC The major savings resulting from eliminating the air combat capability would be operating costs.
Deferral The implications of deferral would depend largely on discussions with the United States and the length of time of deferral. Amendment This is discussed under Terms of Reference 5. Diplomatic Considerations The terms of reference did not extend to consultations with other governments. Brought down to basics, as Brigadier Dunne - until recently Commander of the New Zealand force in East Timor - said: "You are either with the swimmers or the non-swimmers.
Taylor, who now describes himself as a freelancer on LinkedIn, declined to comment, other than to confirm his departure. He cited a non-disclosure agreement. Another staffer told the Herald that Melbourne-based Martin Aircraft director Ran Elias has been made managing director and is currently in charge of the company.
Elias declined the opportunity to comment. But things started to sour June that year when founder Glenn Martin abruptly quit, citing differences with management over commercialisation strategy at the time, the chief executive was Peter Coker; Coker left in August Its shares, which initially performed well, began to struggle as the company failed to gain commercial flight certification and missed its targets to launch a jetpack in and an un-manned ariel vehicle a UAV or drone in And its stock went into a tailspin after the June revelation by then-chief executive James West that the Martin Jetpack Rotron RT engine needed a complete stripdown and maintenance after just 10 hours of flight - well short of the hours that is standard for small aircraft.
That meant the jetpack was not commercially viable in its current form, West said. On August 31 , the company was suspended from the ASX for failing to file its annual accounts on time for its financial year ending June 30 amid belt-tightening as it laid off around a third of the or so staff at its Wigram plant.
The loan was convertible to shares if Martin Aircraft failed to meet a quarterly repayment schedule. Trading resumed on the ASX, but with very low volume. In March this year, Martin Aircraft announced plans to de-list from the Australian exchange and move to Unlisted, the NZ platform for private equity investors to exchange shares.
West departed as chief executive on July 3 and head of operations Taylor began his fleeting tenure at the top via an internal promotion.
Rodl says he's frustrated by the lack of communication from Martin Aircraft since December The Premium Economy cabin was refitted with new recliner seats in a configuration and increased from 36 to 40 seats, while the economy cabin was refitted in a configuration, with the seats replaced with 54 Economy Skycouch seats and regular economy seats. In all, the number of seats increased from to The aircraft retained its Singapore Airlines seat configuration of 26 business class and economy class seats.
A second ER was leased from Singapore Airlines in October of the same year, whilst retaining the same livery. The ER fleet is expected to retire from onwards, following the introduction of the Boeing As introduced, the aircraft had seats — 44 business, 50 premium economy, 60 Economy Skycouch seats and regular economy seats. Air New Zealand refurbished the ER fleet in The Premium Economy Spaceseat product was phased out and replaced with the Premium Economy product as found on the ER and the , with recliner seats in a configuration.
The refit increased the number of premium economy seats from 44 to 54 and the total seats from to In the airline ordered eight Boeing Dreamliners as the launch customer for the model, with options on ten more.
These were originally intended to be delivered beginning in late , [23] but significant development delays in the base model pushed delivery of the out to mid In February , Air New Zealand exercised two options to bring the order to ten, and on 8 December exercised two more to bring the order to twelve. It was scheduled to be delivered during the third quarter of The last was expected to be delivered in late The first aircraft was handed over to Air New Zealand on 8 July at the Everett plant, and arrived in Auckland three days later.
The last five have a higher premium seating configuration, with 27 Business, 33 Premium Economy, 39 Economy Skycouch and standard economy seats, totalling seats. As of June , the airline was still waiting for the issue to be rectified and return the aircraft to Jet Planes New Zealand 007 service.
These events continue to have a financial impact on the airline. On 27 May , Air New Zealand announced that they would be purchasing eight Boeing Dreamliner aircraft, with the first aircraft expected to enter service in The order included twelve options for additional Boeing or Boeing aircraft. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Current fleet of Air New Zealand. Airbus A Airbus Aneo. ATR Boeing ER. Boeing Bombardier Q Air New Zealand historical fleet.
BAe Fokker F Lockheed L Electra. McDonnell Douglas DC
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