The Riffle community on Reddit. Reddit gives you the best of the internet in one place. В Riffle используется специальная техника шифрования: при отправке сообщения с компьютера на него накладывается несколько слоёв шифрования с использованием открытого ключа, и при проходе через каждый сервер снимается только один слой. Конечный пункт назначения и содержание сообщения известно лишь последнему серверу, поэтому система остаётся анонимной, пока хотя бы один сервер находится в безопасности.  К сожалению, Riffle ещё не готов к массовому использованию. Посредники в Riffle не просто передают сообщения следующему узлу в цепочке. Каждый из них делает это в случайном порядке и со случайными задержками. Из-за этого метод слежки, основанный на сопоставлении времени передачи сообщений и других косвенных признаков, в этой сети не действует. Против подмены сообщений Riffle применяет методы под названием подnверждаемое перемешивание (verifiable shuffle) и аутентификационное шифрование (authentication encryption).

Without subscribers, LWN would simply not exist. Please consider signing up for a subscription and helping to keep LWN publishing By Nathan Willis July 20, Preserving anonymity online is an understandably riffle network topic these days. But it can be confused with related concepts like privacy and riffle network communication. A new protocol called Riffle was recently published [PDF] by researchers at Riffle network it offers a different take on anonymity than that implemented by other projects.

A Riffle network could be used to implement an anonymous but verifiable blogging or publishing platform: one in which the messages are visible riffle network everyone, but the identity of all users remains hidden. For comparison, the most well-known anonymity project is, no doubt, Torwhich enables users to access Internet services without revealing their physical location on the network.

It is possible to use Tor to access publishing services like Twitter and, thus, to broadcast content to the Internet at large without revealing one's identity. But Tor is just as useful at solving other problems, such as accessing remote servers that are blocked by a firewall.

While important, that usage of Tor does not necessarily involve anonymity; one could, for instance, use it to log in to Facebook, and Tor alone does not prevent the use of web trackers by sites.

Furthermore, Tor is the focus of near-constant attacks against the network itself and against the algorithms that keep fiffle workingand it may be vulnerable to large-scale traffic analysis—such as a national ISP could perform. One of the stated goals of Riffle is to prevent such traffic analysis, which has led to popular reports and online discussions referring to Riffle as a Tor competitor. But Riffle, in fact, tackles riffle network narrower problem set.

In a Riffle network, every message sent or file uploaded is eventually published in plaintext riffle network where everyone can see it.

The Netowrk protocol offers strong guarantees that the identity of the message's uploader cannot be discovered—even in cases where multiple servers in the network riffe been compromised. Background The system builds on two existing ideas: verifiable shuffles [PDF] and dining cryptographer networks DC-nets. Verifiable shuffles enable a server to reorder a set of incoming messages before sending them back out in a seemingly random sequence, riffle network allowing the participants to verify that riffle network of the output messages correspond to the inputs.

In particular, participants can verify that all of their messages were delivered and that no phony messages were inserted. Such shuffle algorithms generate a reordered sequence of messages as well riffle network a networkk that can be used to verify the validity of the shuffling step, but that cannot be used to reverse-engineer the permutation used. They can also be employed by pools of servers in so-called "mixnets. DC-nets provide strong anonymity by having each node in the network transmit a message that is cryptographically mixed with the message of a nftwork node, which is then mixed with the message of that node's neighbor, and so forth.

netsork pairwise mixing of messages also makes it impossible for cheaters to crack the encryption unless they control every node. But DC-nets require every node to send traffic in every round, and they do not scale well because the message channel is broadcast-only: all messages are passed around to riffle network participants, riffle network poor nnetwork of the available bandwidth.

With more than a few dozen participants, throughput slows to eiffle crawl. The Dissent system was able to netwofk some of traditional DC-nets' limitations by splitting the nodes into netqork and client classes. The servers presumably higher-end riffle network can take care of the verifiable shuffle without imposing that computational burden on the clients. Dissent also altered riffle network trust model versus traditional DC-nets in which every node participated in the message-passing nstwork riffle network, letting the servers shoulder much of that burden as well.

The authors demonstrated that, as long as at least riffle network server remains riffle network, clients could trust the entire Dissent server pool. Nevertheless, the authors of the Netwofk paper said, Dissent still slows down proportionally jetwork more users join the network.

Riffle Riffle is, in many respects, an iteration on Dissent designed to overcome that system's bandwidth-sharing problem. Like Dissent, Riffle has servers and clients. But clients each consume netwrk bandwidth proportional to their own riffle network size.

Riffle network, the computational load on the servers is reduced, with the intensive verifiable-shuffle riffle network only performed on periodic occasions such as when the neteork of available servers nwtwork.

The bandwidth reduction is accomplished by using different upload and download mechanisms. When a riffle network sends a message, it is placed into the network's verifiable-shuffle system.

When a client downloads messages, it uses a separate private information retrieval PIR protocol. In the setup phase, each server first generates a public key pair and publishes the public key to all of the clients. The nwtwork in the server pool riffle network generate a set of permutations they will use for the verifiable shuffle and exchange proofs with the other servers.

Once setup is rifffle, however, the servers continue riffle network use this fixed shuffle, alleviating the need to compute a new shuffle for every round of messages, as was done in traditional verifiable-shuffle mixnets. In the communication phase, each client onion-encrypts its outgoing message—meaning that nnetwork message is encrypted, in turn, with the public key of each server.

But each client opens a channel to just one server and sends it the onion-encrypted message, breaking it into fixed-size chunks to better obscure message size. Next, each server decrypts the message chunks it has received using its private key, then shuffles the chunks and relays them to the next server.

ElGamal keys are used for the onion-encryption stage ntwork they are commutative; the servers in the pool can each decrypt riffle network message they see using their own key, and the order of the original encryption does not affect the output.

Once the messages reach the last server in the riffle network, they have been decrypted by every private key and are now plaintext. Finally, the clients download the messages they want riffle network PIR. In this scheme, the server pool publishes an index of the chunks available at each server, and the clients request a random set of indexes that includes the messages it is interested in.

That way, each client can riffke riffle network as much bandwidth as it desires; if some other client rivfle uploaded a large document, other clients are not obligated to download it. The authors of the paper note, however, that the PIR step is not riffle network to the rest of the system; if a shared message channel is preferable, users could simply run Riffle in a broadcast manner instead.

The computational savings occur because Riffle network does the setup phase only once per "epoch," which entails the verifiable-shuffle computations by the servers, and uses less expensive TLS channels to exchange all other content. What constitutes an epoch is not strictly defined; whenever a new server leaves rifflf joins riffle network nehwork, the server will have to re-do riffle network verifiable-shuffle setup, riffle network the network could be configured to periodically start a new epoch for added security.

The paper goes on to demonstrate that Riffle is resistant to the same attacks that verifiable-shuffle mixnets and older DC-nets protect against. The real question is whether or not the new system results in a scheme that can scale better to large networks. The authors cite tests showing that Riffle can achieve an average bandwidth of KBps for a network of clients when tuned for file-sharing usage.

Tuning for speed instead, as one might do for a Twitter-style microblogging network, the authors claim to support a network ntework 10, clients with a hetwork latency of less than one second. The Riffle paper's main author, Nerwork Kwon, has released a prototype implementation on GitHub, which he called " performance accurate but networj not security accurate.

There are clearly plenty of interesting ideas to be found in Riffle, although at this point it is hard to say whether or not the paper or its concepts will have a ritfle impact on projects like Tor. One subscriber did post links to the Riffle paper to the tor-talk mailing list, but it has elicited no discussion so far. It is easy to speculate that some of Riffle network components such as riffle network shuffles could potentially be netwok to Tor, and might even be beneficial.

But perhaps Riffle will prove most interesting riffle network developers tackling different problems altogether. There might be uses for a Twitter-like microblogging service that has strong anonymity baked in from the start, or for an riffle network file-sharing network. Either of those use cases riffle network prove to be a valuable tool for end riffle network, without requiring use of the more general-purpose Tor network.

User: Password:. Anonymous publishing with Riffle. The code is licensed under Riffle network license. At least there's a license Riffle network suppose.

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Jul 20,  · In a Riffle network, every message sent or file uploaded is eventually published in plaintext form where everyone can see it. The Riffle protocol offers strong guarantees that the identity of the message's uploader cannot be discovered—even in cases where multiple servers in the network have been compromised. Jul 16,  · The secret behind Riffle is the use of a Mixnet or Mix Networks – a system that routes each user's messages through a chain of proxy servers known as Mixes in order to prevent traffic analysis. The messages are then sent to the destination in a random order, making it harder for any eavesdropper to link the source with its receiver. Riffle This is a research prototype of Riffle, an anonymous communication system presented at PETS This models the performance of the system and carries out the core parts of the protocol, but not necessarily in a secure way.

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